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What qualifies a work as distinctly modernist or postmodernist? Moving beyond the idea 
that modernism and postmodernism are primarily distinguishable on a temporal basis, 
D’Errico instead argues that the key difference between these two movements lies on a 
theoretical level. Grounded in a framework of contemporary theory put forth by ​Žižek, 
Lacan, Deleuze, and Badiou, D’Errico proposes that the Real-Symbolic relation 
manifests differently in modernist and postmodernist works; the structural paradigms of 
the torus and rhizome are helpful to illuminate this fundamental theoretical difference. 
Expanding on ​Žižek’s definitions of modernism and postmodernism (from ​Looking 
Awry​), D’Errico posits that a torus-shaped Real-Symbolic relation accords with 
modernism and that a rhizomatic Real-Symbolic relation accords with postmodernism. 
This interdisciplinary analysis of twentieth-century art mainly focuses on literature, but 
also invokes poetry, visual art, theatre, and film. Overall, D’Errico dissects the 
theoretical structures of ​The Sun Also Rises​, ​Waiting for Godot​, ​The Trial​, ​White Noise​, 
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 Notoriously tumultuous and revolutionary, the twentieth-century’s politics, 
economics, and science set the foundation for the Western world as it is experienced 
today. The century’s iconic events—including Albert Einstein’s theorization of relativity, 
the first and second World Wars, Great Depression, Holocaust, decolonization, Civil and 
Women’s Rights Liberation movements, Space Race, popularization of contraceptives, 
Vietnam War, global telecommunication revolution, AIDS crisis, proliferation of nuclear 
weaponry and power, and Edwin Hubble’s discovery that the Milky Way is just one of 
countless galaxies in an expanding universe—all radically and permanently transformed 
society.  
 Meanwhile, twentieth-century philosophical thought consistently unraveled 
established “truths” that, thus far, were assumed to be infallible. Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (1886), for instance, de-
centers morality as the locus of truth and even challenges the vain pursuit of finding a 
supposed truth, effectively launching the century’s nihilistic attitude. He locates 
traditional morality “on the order of astrology and alchemy—but in any case something 
that must be overcome,” and in summary argues: “why insist on the truth?” (Nietzsche 
235, 214). Max Weber’s “Science as a Vocation” (1919) undermines the 
Enlightenment’s belief in the scientific method’s ability to yield absolute truth. Insofar as 
science is a continual work-in-progress, and by definition “asks to be ‘surpassed’ and 
outdated,” the currently-accepted theories are neither complete nor infallible (Weber 
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138). In the realm of psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan proposes that Sigmund Freud’s 
discovery of the unconscious—summarized by the statement, “I is an other”—produced 
a disorientation tantamount to that during the transition from a Ptolemaic geocentric 
solar system to a heliocentric model: “the Freudian discovery has exactly the same 
implication of decentring as that brought about by the Copernican discovery” (Lacan 
Seminar II 7).  
 Evolving contemporaneously, the twentieth-century’s artistic culture was similarly 
turbulent and shocking. Broadly, artists abandoned conventional notions associated 
with various mediums in favor of the “extreme stance of promoting everything previously 
considered ugly,” mirroring the world flipping upside-down around them (Badiou 132). In 
The Century, Alain Badiou specifically outlines twentieth-century artists’ vehement 
rejection of “tonality in music, the figure in painting, humanism in sculpture, [and] the 
immediate intelligibility of syntax in poetry” (Badiou 133). Igor Stravingsky’s atonal “Rite 
of Spring” (1913) composition, Hilma af Klint’s early abstract painting sequence The Ten 
Largest (1907), Vladimir Tatlin’s Corner Counter-Relief (1914), and dadaist Hugo Ball’s 
gibberish poem “Karawane” (1917) each exemplifies Badiou’s idea of the avant-garde in 
their respective mediums.1    
 Overall, twentieth-century culture is broadly categorized into two movements: 
modernism and postmodernism, which are roughly associated with the first and second 
halves of the century. Whereas modernism involves depth, alienation, interiority, angst, 
paranoia, despair, absurdism, apocalysm, incomprehensibility, disillusionment, and 
disenchantment with rational expectations, postmodernism deals with flatness, 
 
1 See Appendix Figures 1-3.  
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spontaneity, simultaneity, chance, pastiche, paradox, irony, anxiety, hybridization, 
collage, anarchy, play, kitsch, plurality, perspectivism, and celebration of the illogical.2 
Yet, the methodology of tracing similarities among works creates a murky classification 
system at best; modernist works can certainly feature paradox, and postmodernist 
works can feature an alienated, angst-ridden protagonist. Therefore, beyond these 
formal and thematic trends, which may more or less appear in a work, what, exactly, are 
the defining criteria that distinguish a work as modernist or postmodernist? Are these 
two movements truly distinct ideological categories? Do they stand in opposition to each 
other, or is one a modification or intensification of the other?  
 Rather than focusing on similar characteristics among items in a set—
characteristics that may extend to items outside of this set—this project strives to 
explore the qualities that dictate which items are inside a set and which are not. In other 
words, this project explores the question of modernism versus postmodernism through 
universal definitions, not characteristics that link particulars. Privileging Slavoj Žižek’s 
conceptual distinction between modernism and postmodernism, but also invoking theory 
put forth by Jacques Lacan, Alain Badiou, Gilles Delueze, and Pierre-Félix Guattari, this 
project applies the criteria that defines a work as modernist or postmodernist to a variety 
of artistic mediums—mainly literature, but also poetry, theatre, visual art, and film.  
 In one of his earliest works, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan 
through Popular Culture (1991), Žižek observes that “all culture is ultimately nothing but 
a compromise formation, a reaction to some terrifying, radically inhuman dimension 
proper to the human condition itself”—namely, the dimension of the Lacanian Real, 
 
2 See Appendix Figure 4. Ihab Hassan’s table is featured in Jim Powell’s Postmodernism for 
Beginners (1998). 
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which this thesis will discuss in detail (Žižek 37). In “Is There a Postmodern Sociology?” 
(1988), Zygmunt Bauman states that the concepts of modernism and postmodernism 
are necessarily “in relation to the way that intellectuals perceive their social location, 
task and strategy” (Bauman 227). This thesis posits that modernist and postmodernist 
works differ in their portrayals of the Real-Symbolic tension, and how people “perceive 
their social location, task and strategy” in relation to this tension.   
 Crucially, this interdisciplinary cultural analysis departs from the faulty notion that 
modernism and postmodernism are predominantly distinguished on a temporal basis, or 
that they form a clear, linear chronology of thought. Rather, the two movements must be 
properly understood as different modes of thought and representation; they 
demonstrate fundamentally different ways of grappling with the human condition, 
particularly in relation to the Real and Symbolic orders. By illuminating how a work 
typically associated with a particular movement may actually be more fitting in another 
category—based on its theoretical structure, whose importance transcends its 
publication date—this project advocates for greater flexibility regarding the classification 
of twentieth-century artworks.  
Žižek presents the following theoretical criteria to define and distinguish the two 
canons: “The lesson of modernism is that the structure, the intersubjective 
machine, works as well if the Thing is lacking, if the machine revolves around an 
emptiness; the postmodernist reversal shows the Thing itself as the incarnated, 
materialized emptiness” (Žižek 145). While modernist works display lack, 
postmodernist works display fullness, even to the point of surplus. In this way, Lacan’s 
ostensibly paradoxical teachings that the Real is lack and the lack of lack show two 
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sides of viewing the Real, with modernism and postmodernism each emphasizing a 
different side. Notably, neither lack nor surplus seems to be a state of a comfortable 
equilibrium, perhaps indicating the inevitability of a Real-Symbolic tension. 
The hallmark of this thesis is the distinction between two structural paradigms—
the torus and the rhizome—and their alignment with modernism and postmodernism, 
respectively.3 First providing the pertinent background on contemporary theory, the rest 
of this introduction defines these structures, dives into the nuances of their spatiality, 
and explains how they serve as lenses through which one can grapple with the 
differences between these two canons.  
Several key concepts from contemporary cultural and literary theory are integral 
to this Žižekian analysis of twentieth-century works: namely, Lacan’s three-registers 
theory of the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary, as well as Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of 
the rhizome. Foremost, throughout his seminars, Lacan developed his tripartite register 
theory; this analysis will focus exclusively on the Symbolic and Real registers. The 
Symbolic “refers to the customs, institutions, laws, mores, norms, practices, rituals, 
rules, traditions, and so on of cultures and societies (with these things being entwined in 
various ways with language)” (Johnston). In this way, the Symbolic correlates to 
“reality.” Meanwhile, the Lacanian Real is “whatever is beyond, behind, or beneath 
phenomenal appearances accessible to the direct experiences of first-person 
awareness” (Johnston). The overwhelming Real threatens engulfment, and, despite 
being the register of the unsignifiable, is where abstractions such as love, death, and 
 
3 See Appendix Figures 5-6. 
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God might be located. Lacan’s championed Borromean knot form illustrates the 
interconnectedness of these registers (Johnston).  
In Lacan and the Concept of the ‘Real’ (2012), Tom Eyers asserts that since “the 
very beginning of his teaching… Lacan ‘spatialized’ his theory of the registers” (Eyers 
62). In Seminar XXII, for example, Lacan discusses the “topology” of the registers, 
positing that the “organization of life,” which correlates to the Symbolic, seems to be in 
“a sort of torsion… in order to lodge itself in [R]eal space” (Lacan Seminar XXII 262). 
Torsion, by mathematical definition, involves curvature beyond a singular plane 
dimension, thereby implying depth. While the Symbolic field is positioned in such Real 
space, the spatiality between the two registers cannot be reduced to a “simple 
‘inside/outside’ relation” (Eyers 61). Almost exactly in parallel, Charles Shepherdson’s 
Lacan and the Limits of Language (2008) insists that “the relation between the 
[S]ymbolic and the [R]eal cannot be approached if one begins with a dichotomy 
between inside and outside” (Shepherdson 3). Lacan himself explains that the 
distinction between “externality and internality… makes no sense at all at the level of 
the [R]eal” (Lacan Seminar II 97).  
Instead, the “Real is simultaneously ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the Symbolic” (Eyers 
62). Shepherdson explains that the Real is an “absent center” and a “lack that arises 
within the [S]ymbolic order,” and that at the same time, the Real is “beyond” the 
Symbolic (Shepherdson 15, 18, 14). In effect, there is a “constitutive interpenetration of 
the Symbolic and the Real” (Eyers 37). The idea of a “porous” Symbolic further portrays 
the idea of an all-surrounding, encroaching Real that seeps into the reality; the Real is 
the central void at the heart of the Symbolic (Žižek 33).   
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Capturing this spatial complexity is the torus structure—a donut shape. This 
project argues that the torus form accords with modernism, and is theoretically evident 
in modernist works. The defining qualities of the torus are 1) its incompleteness from a 
central hole, which constitutes a “void within the structure,” and 2) the void surrounding 
the exterior of the donut shape as well (Shepherdson 3). Together, these essential 
features produce the torus’s defining quality of extimité [extimacy]—an excluded 
interiority or, alternatively, an included exteriority.  
Two particular examples that Žižek analyzes in Looking Awry convey the torus-
model relationship between the Real and Symbolic. First, Žižek focuses on a scene 
from Robert A. Heinlein’s The Unpleasant Profession of Jonathan Hoag (1942) in which 
a couple, thoroughly frightened upon seeing a vast “grey and formless mist, pulsing 
slowly as if with inchoate life” while driving, hastily roll up their car window to shut it out 
(Žižek 14). Here, Žižek reads the grey mist as the “pulsing of the pre[S]ymbolic 
substance”—a visual representation of the nebulous nothingness of the Real, a 
disgusting exteriority incessantly trying to push its way into the Symbolic field (Žižek 
14).4 In addition, Žižek interprets the tennis game scene from Michelangelo Antonioni’s 
Blow Up as emblematic of modernist works. The fact that the players continue to play 
the tennis game without a tangible tennis ball demonstrates a typically-modernist 
functioning around a central lack: “the game works without an object” (Žižek 143). In this 
example, the work emphasizes the void at the center of the system.  
The torus’s structure illustrates the stability and instability produced by the 
exterior Real’s constant threat to swallow the donut-shaped Symbolic order, while 
 
4 Notably, this amorphous mist shares qualities with a Heideggerian-type “unformed matter” that is 
“nonbeing,” as discussed in “What is Metaphysics?” (Heidegger 107).  
 8 
simultaneously supporting it insofar as the donut-shape derives from its very lack of 
center. Žižek highlights this paradoxical relation: “the role of the Lacanian real” is two-
sided, as it “derail[s] the balance of our daily lives, but it serves at the same time as a 
support of this very balance” (Žižek 29). In parallel, “the Real simultaneously supports 
and threatens the Symbolic from within” (Eyers 45).  
The torus shape shows the fragile barrier between the Real and Symbolic orders, 
with an interpenetration occurring in the form of a central void. The surrounding Real 
threatens to engulf from outside; the internal Real threatens to suck the Symbolic into its 
black hole. In this way, the torus paradigm also captures Badiou’s ideas about threshold 
preservation in The Century. Specifically, Badiou posits that a “contempt for… an 
installation” and preservation of a the “threshold… without a crossing” are characteristic 
of twentieth-century poetry (Badiou 24). What Badiou attributes to the entire century, 
here, this thesis applies to modernist works in general; postmodernist works, on the 
other hand, display an acceleration toward the threshold and even a destruction of the 
threshold-barrier.  
Deleuze and Guattari's rhizome structure presented in the introductory chapter of 
A Thousand Plateaus (1980) is helpful to visualize the postmodernist Real-Symbolic 
relation, one that involves a destruction of any barrier between the inside and outside, 
instead favoring imbrication. Essentially, the rhizome is an infinite network of 
outgrowths; it is “ramified surface extension in all directions” (Deleuze & Guattari 7). 
Deleuze and Guattari explicate how “the rhizome is made of plateaus” and is limitless 
sans borders (Deleuze & Guattari 21). Whereas the torus structure involves depth, the 
rhizome demonstrates pure flatness: the Real and Symbolic registers are embroidered 
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into a flat, impregnated plane. Rhizomatic flatness is such that it “never has available a 
supplementary dimension” and, again, that there is “the impossibility of a supplementary 
dimension” (Deleuze & Guattari 9). Rhizomes each “fill or occupy all of their 
dimensions,” in accordance with the postmodernist idea of fullness (Deleuze & Guattari 
9). Rhizomatic pervasiveness connects to the “ubiquitous and invasive nature of 
postmodernity” (Francese 6). 
Additionally, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that within the rhizome, “there are 
no points or positions… only lines” (Deleuze & Guattari 8). Herein lies a fundamental 
difference with the modernist torus paradigm, which clearly features a central void that 
everything revolves around. The modernist structure displays being surrounded by the 
Real on all sides and penetrated in the center; the rhizomatic postmodernist structure, 
on the other hand, “has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from 
which it grows and which it overspills,” and “it is always in the middle, between things, 
interbeing, intermezzo” (Deleuze & Guattari 21, 25). This quality of omnipresent milieu 
is the reverse of modernism, which “plots a point”—the point of central lack—and “fixes 
an order” of the barrier-separated inside and outside, although the torus’s extimate 
structure undermines the legitimacy of this distinction (Deleuze & Guattari 7).   
 This project proposes a synthesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome with that of 
Žižek’s postmodernist Real. Conceptualizing the Real as rhizomatic in structure is 
advantageous to comprehend the invasive nature of the Real, and its planar imbrication 
with the Symbolic in postmodernist works. The two concepts can be linked in the 
several ways. Deleuze and Guattari connect the rhizome to a weed, asserting that “the 
weed is the Nemesis of human endeavor…. Eventually the weed gets the upper hand. 
 10 
The weed exists only to fill the waste spaces left by cultivated areas. It grows between, 
among other things” (Deleuze & Guattari 19). The rhizome grows in-between just as the 
Real fills the crevasses of the Symbolic order. Postmodernism views the Real as 
lodging itself in Symbolic space rhizomatically. It is critical to note that the Real 
examined in this project is rhizomatic in structure, filling in the cracks of the Symbolic—
the rhizome, as a shape, is not the equivalent of the Real, for Lacan says that the Real 
“is absolutely without fissure” (Lacan Seminar II 97). This proposition to connect the 
Deleuzian rhizome with the Lacanian Real is also compatible with Badiou’s treatment of 
the Real as gap in The Century, insofar as the rhizomatic Real occupies the cracks 
within the Symbolic (Badiou 56).   
 In sum: this project posits a distinction between a structure centered on absence 
and a structure absent any centricity—and that this distinction, captured by the torus 
and rhizome paradigms—is key to understand the conceptual divide between modernist 
and postmodernist thought. The following chapters proceed by dissecting the theoretical 
structure of multiple works. As The Sun Also Rises and Waiting for Godot exemplify a 
torus-structured Real-Symbolic relation, they align with modernism; as The Trial, White 














MODERNISM’S EXTIMATE VOID OF THE REAL 
 
 
The Sun Also Rises 
Ernest Hemingway, 1926 
Set in post-World War I France and Spain, Hemingway’s novel depicts a cohort 
of friends who, restless and unfulfilled, spend their days incessantly drinking and 
traveling in efforts to distract themselves from the nada—the irrepressible, all-powerful 
lurking nothingness threatening to swallow them. In essence, nada is “the strange, 
unknowable, impending threat of nihilation” (Stolzfus 212).5 Aligned with the Lacanian 
Real insofar as it is utter nothingness, Hemingway’s nada “connotes the absence of 
transcendent authority and the absence of a priori values. It emphasizes 
meaninglessness, the contingency of life, and the impossibility of deliverance from any 
of these ontological states” (Stolzfus 212).  
The Sun Also Rises shows how the paranoid characters strive to fend off the 
menacing, encroaching nada (or Real) by busying themselves with superficial Symbolic-
order festivities. Their desperate attempts to fortify the barrier between the Symbolic 
and the Real—between life in society and the vacuity of death—exemplify a Badiouian 
“maintenance” and “guarding of the threshold” without a crossing (Badiou 22, 24).6 
Despite the characters’ attempts to repel the nada, or in other words, preserve an 
 
5 Stolzfus attributes this definition of nada to John Killinger.  
6 As mentioned earlier, this project applies Badiou’s theory about twentieth-century poetry’s fixation 
on preserving the threshold, namely the “contempt for everything that represents an installation,” 
including the ultimate installation of death, to modernist works in particular (Badiou 24). 
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inside/outside distinction, some integral “extimate kernel” of the Real is already lodged 
at “the very heart of the [S]ymbolic”; it is what “the [S]ymbolic field is… structured 
around” (Žižek 33). The Real as lack occupies this privileged central position in The Sun 
Also Rises and modernist works in general, superseding any previously-perceived 
“infallible” center on which society is organized: examples include religion, logic, and the 
scientific method. Whereas cultural history could previously be understood as “a series 
of substitutions of center for center,” Jacques Derrida proposes that in the early 
twentieth century, “it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no center” (Odin 
62). “No center” in modernism corresponds to the jarring discovery of a gaping lack at 
the core of society—the empty “widening gyre” in William Butler Yeats’s “The Second 
Coming” (1920). In postmodernism, “no center” corresponds to the complete unraveling 
of the gyre structure. The central position no longer exists, the locus once believed to 
yield some kind of truth value is obsolete—or, more extremely, the faith that there once 
was a center is lost. The postmodernist take on “no center” effectively translates to: 
everywhere is milieu. Here lies the nuanced difference between a structure centered on 
absence and a structure absent any centricity.  
To return to the text at hand, considering Hemingway’s characters’ desire to keep 
the nada as far away or “exterior” as possible, in conjunction with their grappling with a 
central absence instead of any a priori morality or meaning, reveals a definitive torus 
structure, clearly positioning The Sun Also Rises in the modernist canon on a theoretical 
basis. The rest of this section dives into the intricacies of the extimité that Hemingway 
portrays.  
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The characters develop several strategies to distance and distract themselves 
from the nada/Real, including: 1) the evasion of sleeping alone or in darkness, an act 
associated with death, 2) a “running away” lifestyle that involves traveling, rampant 
alcoholism, and fiesta celebrations, and 3) the compulsion to hunt, an attempt to 
conquer death. Foremost, protagonist Jake Barnes admits that “for six months [he] 
never slept with the electric light off,” because in the dark, he can only “lay awake 
thinking and [with his] mind jumping around” (Hemingway 136, 35). In comparison, 
characters fall asleep relatively easily when taking naps in the afternoon daylight 
(Hemingway 116). While struggling to fall asleep, Jake tries to convince himself that 
“there is no reason why because it is dark you should look at things differently from 
when it is light” (Hemingway 136). Regardless of whether or not the characters 
acknowledge it, their paranoia of falling asleep alone in darkness likely derives from 
how this experience previews death and being swallowed by the Real. Aside from 
daylight, sounds belonging to Symbolic-order operations, such as the monotonous 
clicking of the typewriter or the “heavy trams go[ing] by and way down the street,” also 
facilitate the characters’ ability to sleep because, grounded in reality, they dissociate the 
act of sleeping with the Real of death (Hemingway 19, 35). 
Additionally, the characters’ partying lifestyle and constant travels are attempts to 
mentally and physically escape the abhorrent Real. Jake notes how his daily life 
involves “much wine, an ignored tension, and a feeling of things coming that you could 
not prevent happening,” understanding well that, “under the wine [he] los[es] the 
disgusted feeling and [is] happy” (Hemingway 135). Most of all, Hemingway highlights 
the characters’ paranoid avoidance of the nada through their obsession with the fiesta. 
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For seven days, the characters immerse themselves in a stimulus-overload of religious 
processions and other Symbolic-order rituals: “The dancing kept up, the drinking kept 
up, the noise went on” (Hemingway 142). Gravitating toward the cognitive sensory 
overload it offers, Jake explains how: “Everything became quite unreal finally and it 
seemed as though nothing could have any consequences. It seemed out of place to 
think of consequences during the fiestas,” alluding to the ultimate consequence of death 
(Hemingway 142). Evidently, the excitement and incessant chatter surrounding the 
fiesta provide an attractive opportunity for characters to barricade the Real outside the 
comforts of the Symbolic.  
Third, bull-fighting offers a false sense of triumph over the Real; the spectacle of 
conquering animals’ lives and narrowly evading decimation by the bull gives characters 
an unwarranted confidence about escaping the threatening grasp of the Real. Since the 
powerful bull has the potential to annihilate Matador Romero at any moment, yet he still 
temporarily “dominate[s] the bull by making him realize he was unattainable,” he, and all 
those watching, feel as though it is impossible for the nada to swallow them 
(Hemingway 153-154). Later, Romero gifts the bull’s ear as a tangible token of his 
purported victory to his love interest (Hemingway 179).  
In The Sun Also Rises, the characters’ evasion of sleeping alone, incessant 
partying, and obsession with bull-fighting are essentially efforts to maintain a distinct 
barrier between Real and Symbolic realms. Therefore, just as the petrified couple from 
Heinlein’s The Unpleasant Profession of Jonathan Hoag that Žižek analyzes in Looking 
Awry tries to “roll up the [car] window” and shut out the “grey and formless mist” of the 
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Real, so does this cohort of alcoholics strive to do the same, primarily through the three 
aforementioned strategies (Žižek 14). 
Critical to the torus paradigm is the notion extimité, which entails the Real 
embedded at the core of the system, “the central impossibility around which every 
signifying network is structured” (Žižek 143). The Sun Also Rises portrays extimité most 
obviously through the lack of a value system, a lack around which all the characters’ 
actions swirl superficially: the modernist “machine revolves around an emptiness” (Žižek 
145). In addition to the nihilistic atheism ushered in by Friedrich Nietzsche’s 1882 
proclamation that “God is dead,” George Simmel’s 1903 essay “The Metropolis and 
Mental Life” contributes to an explanation of why morality’s obsoleteness is 
characteristic of modernism. Simmel discusses how rapid industrialization led the city-
dwelling factory worker to become “a single cog... against the vast overwhelming 
organization of things and forces which gradually take out of his hands everything 
connected with progress, spirituality and value” (Simmel 337). Especially in the post-
Great War context, at the forefront of people’s minds was a horror of a Badiouian 
“absolute violence of the [R]eal” associated with the introduction of new scientific 
warfare innovations, such as mustard gas, and remorse for an absent God—a 
necessary condition for the atrocities of war to have happened (Badiou 52). Badiou 
elaborates, “Violence is legitimized by the creation of a new man. Needless to say, this 
theme only makes sense within the horizon of the death of God. A godless humanity 
must be recreated, so as to replace the humanity that was subject to the gods” (Badiou 
32). He associates violence with the “horror of the [R]eal” (Badiou 19). The prevalence 
of the violent Real, especially exposed during wartime, made clear to society that its 
 16 
prerequisite had been realized: the death of God, and accordingly, of traditional 
morality.  
One of Hemingway’s short stories, “A Clean, Well-Lighted Place” (1933), very 
clearly shows the modernist recognition of indifferent nothingness at the place where 
comforting religion once was, specifically through the repetitious substitution of the word 
nada into The Lord’s Prayer: 
Our nada who art in nada, nada be thy name thy kingdom nada thy will be nada 
in nada as it is in nada. Give us this nada our daily nada and nada us our nada 
as we nada our nadas and nada us not into nada but deliver us from nada; pues 
nada. Hail nothing full of nothing, nothing is with thee (“A Clean, Well-Lighted 
Place” 150).  
Hemingway demonstrates this same absence of morality in The Sun Also Rises through 
the blatant disrespect for life, both animal and human, which are abused for personal 
gain. For example, the massacring of innocent bulls is unanimously accepted: “All for 
sport. All for pleasure” (Hemingway 178). Hemingway further conveys this reckless 
indifference to life when a man slips by the arena’s entrance only to be mercilessly 
disregarded and killed by greedy bull-fighting spectators: “The man who had been gored 
lay face down in the trampled mud” (Hemingway 177-178).  
Conversation at a dinner party explicitly addresses the lack of morality, as a 
guest casually quips, “You haven’t any values. You’re dead, that’s all,” and mockingly 
notes that “Food had an excellent place in the count’s values. So did wine” (Hemingway 
62). Peering “into the abyss of nada” consequently prompts the characters to try to fill 
“meaninglessness with a new essence” (Stolzfus 209, 206). In other words, the 
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characters create and propose their own value systems to live by—this act implies the 
void of a relevant ethical system. For instance, Jake devises his own exchange-based 
moral ideology, positing: 
You gave up something and got something else. Or you worked for 
something….. Either you paid by learning about them, or by experience, or by 
taking chances, or by money. Enjoying living was learning to get your money’s 
worth and knowing when you had it…. It seemed like a fine philosophy. In five 
years, [he] thought, it will seem just as silly as all the other fine philosophies 
[he’s] had… [he] did not care what it was all about (Hemingway 137).  
Thereafter, acting upon his transactional religion, Jake asserts that, “If you want people 
to like you you have only to spend a little money. I spent a little money and the waiter 
liked me. He appreciated my valuable qualities…. It would be a sincere liking because it 
would have a sound basis” (Hemingway 210). Here, Jake demonstrates Simmel’s 
theory of the twentieth-century’s new “money economy,” which involved “transforming 
the world into an arithmetic problem… fixing every one of its parts in a mathematical 
formula” and the “quantitative relationships of the metropolis” (Simmel 327, 338). 
Additionally, Hemingway’s depiction of Jake’s quantitative value system is the very type 
of modernist portrayal that György Lukács criticizes in his essay, “The Ideology of 
Modernism” (1962). Prioritizing transactional convenience over genuine empathy or 
care, Jake’s philosophy reduces the “human condition” to “a solitary being, incapable of 
meaningful relationships”—which Lukács despises (Lukács 24).  
 Jake’s love interest, Brett, also creates her own value system, suggesting that 
“deciding not to be a bitch” is “sort of what we have instead of God” (Hemingway 220-
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221). Insofar as the characters put forward their own philosophies and debate how one 
should act, The Sun Also Rises implies a lack of pre-existing morality at the heart of 
their Symbolic order. At best, their frail ideologies superficially patch over the gaping 
void of morality—they do not abolish the void. Jake sums up the complete ambivalence 
about how to act when he notes, “That was morality; things made you disgusted 
afterward. No, that must be immorality” (Hemingway 137). The conflation of these two 
opposites effectively cancels out the concept of morality and suggests its utter absence. 
This void of morality at the center of the characters’ existence, along with the nada that 
they struggle to guard their reality against by partying and bull-fighting, suggests that 
Hemingway’s portrayal of the Real is simultaneously within and outside the Symbolic, 
illustrating the very extimité that defines the modernist torus structure.  
 
Waiting for Godot   
Samuel Beckett, 1954 
The vain, unanswerable plea, “What are we doing here, that is the question,” 
expresses both frustration with an inexplicable Heideggerian geworfenheit [thrownness] 
and meta realization of Waiting for Godot’s radical plotless-ness (Beckett 70). Lacking 
any conventional plot progression whatsoever, the main characters Estragon (Gogo) 
and Vladimir (Didi) instead face the overarching task of avoiding the Real while trapped 
in a desolate, enclosed mono-setting. Compared to Hemingway’s characters, Gogo and 
Didi face starkly fewer opportunities to distract themselves from the Real—far from the 
stimulus overload of the week-long fiesta in Western Europe, Beckett’s setting merely 
involves a road and a tree (Beckett 1). On the verge of absolute nothingness, Gogo and 
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Didi desperately strive to grip onto their minimalist Symbolic reality, the singular self-
proclaimed purpose of waiting for the indistinct Godot, and any indicators that legitimize 
their existence in attempt to prevent the Real from completely taking over.    
Despite their attempts to shield against this encroaching unsignifiable 
nothingness, it actually is already lodged at the center of their existence; it is the 
“widening gyre” that the entire play revolves around (Yeats). In this way, the Real 
“derail[s] the balance of [their] daily lives, but it serves at the same time as a support of 
this very balance” (Žižek 29). Insofar as nothingness already gapes at the once-
privileged core of morality, logic, and meaning—while Didi and Gogo attempt to 
barricade themselves against a looming Real of death—Waiting for Godot exemplifies 
the extimité that defines the modernist torus paradigm.  
Before fully jumping into a Žižekian analysis of Beckett’s play, it is helpful to 
understand Žižek’s interpretation of Kazimir Malevich’s Suprematist paintings, 
particularly Black Square (1915).7 In Looking Awry, he reads the “simple black square 
on a white background” as the central void of the Real threatening to swallow the 
surrounding Symbolic field (Žižek 19). Black Square is the:  
[manifestation] of a struggle to save the barrier separating the [R]eal from reality, 
that is, to prevent the [R]eal (the central black square) from overflowing the entire 
field, to preserve the distance between the square and what must at any cost 
whatsoever remain its background (Žižek 19). 
Žižek’s emphasis on upholding the barrier in modernist works, which Badiou also 
emphasizes in The Century, is exactly what Waiting for Godot demonstrates. Although 
 
7 See Appendix Figure 7.  
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Beckett’s characters, stuck in their bleak environment, are significantly closer to being 
swallowed by the “central black square” than Hemingway’s characters are, they still 
strive to uphold the barrier between the fields in a characteristically modernist way.  
 Even more extreme than Jake’s acknowledgment of “things coming that you 
could not prevent happening”—with “things” as euphemistic of death—in The Sun Also 
Rises, Beckett’s characters are very aware of their eventual fate of irreversibly falling 
into the abyss of the Real (Hemingway 135). Gogo and Didi’s sneers about the slave 
Lucky’s “slobber” and eyes “goggling out of his head” as he whimpers, paired with their 
solemn repetition, “It’s inevitable,” point to a disgust with the human form’s fate of decay 
and disfigurement (Beckett 18). In parallel, given that Pozzo (the blind, abusive passer-
byer) represents “all humanity,” the unanimous aversion to his helpless writhing on the 
road reveals mortal angst (Beckett 74). Vladimir’s vehement declarations, such as, “Let 
us do something, while we have the chance!” and “Let us make the most of it, before it 
is too late!,” show his awareness of the impending threat of the Real and desire to 
distract himself (Beckett 70).  
Yet Vladimir and Estragon’s existences are already precarious: at the beginning 
of the play, Estragon poses, “Am I?,” an initial and fundamental question of which the 
answer remains unclear (Beckett 1). Teetering on the brink of the abyss, Vladimir and 
Estragon desperately attempt to confirm their existence by 1) questioning the 
mysterious little boy, 2) not vocalizing their nighttime dreams, and 3) postponing the 
possibility of suicide—all of which are essentially efforts to delay the “installation,” and 
guard “the threshold… without a crossing” (Badiou 24). For instance, Vladimir implores 
the young boy who briefly passes through their setting, “You did see us, didn’t you?,” to 
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which the boy responds “Yes”; however, a parallel scene in the second and final act 
undermines this confidence (Beckett 43). When Vladimir similarly desperately 
beseeches, “You’re sure you saw me, you won’t come and tell me tomorrow that you 
never saw me,” the boy runs away without confirming Vladimir’s existence (Beckett 82-
83).  
Additionally, as is evident from Vladimir and Estragon’s discussion of the act of 
thinking, Beckett completely punctures a hole in traditional Cartesian logic:  
Vladimir: What is terrible is to have thought.  
Estragon: But did that ever happen to us? (Beckett 54).  
By questioning the possibility of human thought, Estragon’s statement unravels the 
formula of Cogito, ergo sum [I think, therefore I am], and destabilizes their status as 
alive and outside of the Real. Later, in Estragon’s statement, “We always find 
something… to give us the impression we exist,” the diction of “impression” conveys a 
frighteningly dubious attitude about one’s own existence (Beckett 59).  
The motif of dreams further demonstrates characters’ attempts to distance 
themselves from the Real. Vladimir’s emphatic resistance to Estragon explaining his 
dream—he repeatedly shouts “DON’T TELL ME!”—suggests the prospect that the 
dream might match their current experience, that their entire lives are only a dream 
(Beckett 8). By questioning, “Sometimes I wonder if I’m not still asleep,” and “Am I 
sleeping now?,” the characters position themselves in a liminal space between life and 
being swallowed by the void (Beckett 77, 81).  
However, ultimately, the threshold is preserved, rendering Waiting for Godot a 
modernist work. While they initially entertain the possibility of hanging themselves, they 
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never realize this proposition, and by the end of the play, declare “We’ll hang ourselves 
tomorrow,” which, circularly, could have been what they promised yesterday (Beckett 9, 
84). This modernist delay of the threshold-crossing is reminiscent of a moment in 
Thomas Mann’s Death in Venice (1912): Aschenbach’s ride in a coffin-resembling 
gondola. Although the relaxation of death might be alluring, Aschenbach insists that “he 
must not relax too completely” (Mann 40). Postmodernist works, on the other hand (as 
this project explores in detail later), feature an acceleration toward the threshold and a 
breakdown of barriers, such as when Josef K. accelerates toward his death at the end 
of The Trial. In addition to the preservation of a threshold that marks an inside/outside 
relation, there is some “external” void of the Real at the heart of Beckett’s universe. The 
rest of this section explores this play’s dimension of extimité.  
Waiting for Godot features the obvious central absence of Godot’s arrival. The 
void of the Godot figure represents the newly-realized void at the center of society—a 
realization spurred by the nihilistic rejection (and newfound obsoleteness) of ethics, 
logic, and purpose, all of which were taken for granted as infallible during the pre-
modernist era.  
 First, just as in The Sun Also Rises, Beckett’s play portrays the obsoleteness of 
traditional morality and religion. Shockingly, when discussing the Bible, Estragon 
blatantly disregards Scriptural content in favor of the supplementary maps; when 
Vladimir asks about the Gospels, Estragon effectively denies their importance by 
responding about images of the Dead Sea. Estragon says, “I remember the maps of the 
Holy Land…. The Dead Sea was pale blue. The very look of it made me thirsty” 
(Beckett 4). In the absence of guidelines on how to behave, characters develop their 
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own value systems. For example, Estragon proposes, “That’s the idea, let’s abuse each 
other,” which alludes to the lack of humanistic morals during the two World Wars and 
Holocaust (Beckett 65). In another instance, the characters flirt with the idea of a 
Simmelian exchange-based value system, similar to Jake in The Sun Also Rises: Gogo 
and Didi do not care about Pozzo as he shouts for help, struggling to get up from the 
ground. The unbothered characters only start to demonstrate interest when Pozzo 
offers money, beseeching, “Help! I’ll pay you!” (Beckett 71). The fact that they entertain 
different value systems to live by highlights the central lack of morality to begin with. 
Similar to in The Sun Also Rises, their flimsy ethical system substitutions fail to 
adequately plug the void. 
 Second, the early to mid-twentieth century saw a modernist recognition of both 
science’s failure to lead to absolute truth and rationalism’s failure to lead to progress. In 
“Science as a Vocation,” Weber dispels the notion that the scientific method has 
successfully yielded absolute truth; he instead argues that science is a continual 
process, a succession of discoveries that supersede previous ones. Science, by 
definition, “asks to be ‘surpassed’ and outdated,” and what is learned and 
“accomplished will be antiquated in ten, twenty, fifty years” (Weber 138). Beckett 
conveys the emerging disillusionment with the idea of science and rationalism’s 
infallibility through the lack of consistent logic in Waiting for Godot.  
 Specifically, the disorientation derived from the failure of logic to translate to 
scientific truth and societal progress manifests in Waiting for Godot’s motif of 
nonsensical surroundings—the characters flounder helplessly in a constantly shifting 
and unpredictable landscape of which they cannot make sense. For instance, Vladimir 
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believes he has a carrot and then is surprised and befuddled upon pulling a turnip out of 
his pocket (Beckett 12). Later, the characters cannot decide on the color of Estragon’s 
boots; they seem to be chameleonic. Vladimir asks, “You’re sure yours were black?” to 
which Estragon replies, “Well they were a kind of grey…. Well they’re a kind of green” 
(Beckett 58). Within such an unsettlingly malleable environment, the characters try to 
grip onto any physical constants in order to validate their supposed sanity and reason:  
Estragon: The sun. The moon. Do you not remember?  
Vladimir: They must have been there, as usual (Beckett 57).  
Except, similar to Josef K.’s experience in Kafka’s The Trial, nothing is constant; the 
inability to discern—not to mention comprehend—their immediate environment reveals 
their powerlessness. In a final example of the void of reason showcased in this play, the 
stage directions that highlight the abruptness of nightfall, “The light suddenly fails. In a 
moment, it is night,” blatantly contradict Pozzo’s elaborate explanation of the gradual 
process of dusk: “tirelessly torrents of red and white light it begins to lose its effulgence, 
to grow pale… pale, ever a little paler, a little paler until” it becomes dark (Beckett 43, 
29). Evidently, through Gogo and Didi’s metamorphosing tempo-spatial reality, Beckett 
illustrates the alarming realization that what was believed to be the infallible core of 
society is actually null. 
 Furthermore, the recognition of rationalism’s inability to illuminate truth about the 
purpose of human existence contributed to the modernist experience of Heideggerian 
geworfenheit—a sense of being thrown into the world sans explanation. José 
Ortega y Gasset’s The Revolt of the Masses (1929) discusses this feeling of 
irreconcilable thrown-ness, stating that “life does not choose its own world, it finds itself, 
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to start with, in a world” (Ortega 47). Here, the diction of “finds itself” accentuates 
passivity and randomness. Weber discusses how disenchantment with the idea of an 
infallible science relates to geworfenheit, citing Leo Tolstoy: “Science is meaningless 
because it gives us no answer to our question, the only question important for us: ‘What 
shall we do and how shall we live?’” (Weber 143).  
 Completely inverting the Enlightenment’s championing of the efficacy of 
rationality and the scientific method to comprehensively learn about an orderly cosmos, 
Waiting for Godot exposes logic’s inability to explain human purpose. When Estragon 
says to use intelligence, Vladimir replies with “I remain in the dark,” emblematic of how 
humanity futilely gropes for inaccessible information in an entropic cosmos (Beckett 9). 
More directly: “People are bloody ignorant apes” (Beckett 5). Beckett further 
demonstrates this idea when the newly-blind Pozzo asks Vladmir where they are, and 
Vladimir, who can ostensibly “see,” nevertheless admits, “I couldn’t tell you,” suggesting 
humans’ relatively powerless status in regard to answering the big questions (Beckett 
77). Tormented by an existential ennui, Estragon implores Vladimir, “Tell me what to 
do,” to which Vladimir replies, “There’s nothing to do”—it is vain to try and decipher 
humanity’s purpose (Beckett 64). Accordingly, the slave Lucky’s name is only partially 
ironic: while he is reduced to a subhuman status, he is lucky insofar as he has clear 
delineated instructions from Pozzo and a task of carrying the bags to complete. The 
overwhelming unknown of what to do with limited time before the imminent unknown of 
death creates modernist paranoia.  
 Inherently tied to the void of logic is the void of meaning: logic’s utter inability to 
discern humanity’s purpose suggests the idea of humanity’s purposelessness. Weber 
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posits that it cannot “be proved that the existence of the world which these sciences 
describe is worth while [sic], that is has any ‘meaning,’ or that it makes sense to live in 
such a world…. Whether life is worth while living and when—this question is not asked 
by medicine” (Weber 144). Heidegger similarly asserts that “science wishes to know 
nothing of the nothing” (Heidegger 96). Moreover, Lukács’s idea that “every human 
action is based on a presupposition of its inherent meaningfulness… [the] absence of 
meaning makes a mockery of action” explains the reduction of Waiting for Godot’s plot 
to buffoonery (Lukács 36). Beckett shows this meaninglessness not only through the 
futility of the characters’ efforts to understand and improve their situation, but also 
through the ineffectiveness of language.  
 Notably, Waiting for Godot reveals a startling failure of language to correspond to 
a stable meaning, breaking down the chain of signification proper to the Symbolic. The 
prevalence of non-sequiturs and non-linear dialogue creates disjointures that effectively 
cancel the meaning of what was said immediately prior. For instance, Estragon asks, 
“Why doesn’t he put down his bags?” to which Pozzo replies, addressing a completely 
different topic, “I too would be happy to meet him” (Beckett 21). Then, Pozzo quips 
about his slave, “he doesn’t put down his bags, as you call them,” a statement that 
opens up the possibility for the signifier “bags” to not correlate with the signified objects. 
Vladimir even encourages the non-correlation between dialogue and reality, asking 
Estragon to “say you are [happy], even if it’s not true” (Beckett 21, 50). When Pozzo 
asks Estragon what his name is, Estragon bluntly and unproblematically declares, 
“Adam,” which accentuates this discord (Beckett 28).  
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 More extremely, language devolves throughout the play to become phonetic 
blobs, such as “You waagerrim?” for “You want to get rid of him?” (Beckett 23). 
Nonsensical gibberish sounds replace words backed by meaning: Lucky blabs, “Oh tray 
bong, tray tray tray bong,” and “quaquaquaqua” (Beckett 29, 33). The theatrical medium 
provides an interesting avenue for exposing the meaninglessness of words through the 
juxtaposition of stage directions with dialogue. Examples of stage directions and 
dialogue glaringly contradicting each other include: “[without gesture] Over there,” or 
“Yes let’s go. [They do not move]” (Beckett 2, 45).  
 Overall, this play involves a circular search for meaning: characters turn to each 
other, to a Nietzschean non-existent God, to the audience; the audience scours the 
nihilistic scenes for symbols and themes, with all movement swirling around the central 
void. There is no meaning. The threatening hole—opened up by the absence of 
meaning, morality, rationalism—is Godot. The singular name captures all of these 
absences, around which the entire play revolves. The modernist “machine revolves 
around an emptiness” that it verges on collapsing into (Žižek 145). As a result of the 
emptiness or “gyre” located at the heart of their reality, “Mere anarchy is loosed upon 
the world” (Yeats). Estragon demonstrates this chaos by questioning, “But what 
Saturday? And is it Saturday? Is it not rather Sunday? [Pause.] Or Monday? [Pause.] Or 
Friday?” (Beckett 7). 
 Clearly, rather than substituting a certain doctrine as the central tenet of society, 
Beckett exposes the absent center. Coupling this decentering with the upholding of the 
Real-Symbolic barrier, which is evidenced by the characters’ attempts to busy 
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themselves, confirm their existence, and delay suicide, illustrates a structure of extimité 





































Franz Kafka, 1925 
 A self-proclaimed rational man in an irrational universe, banking officer Josef K. 
wakes up to his own arrest based on an undisclosed charge about which no one gives 
him any information, despite his extreme confusion. Josef K. becomes increasingly 
entangled in a ridiculous mess of bureaucratic proceedings; the hyperbolically absurd 
legal system plagues every aspect of his life. Kafka’s novel shows the plight of the 
logical individual who struggles to grapple with his inexplicable situation, and whose 
logical mindset alienates him from the world insofar as he cannot decipher the law that 
everyone else appears to intuitively understand (or at least accept).  
 Adding to the absurdity of K.’s experience is his startling inability to accurately 
perceive his immediate environment. Similar to Waiting for Godot’s characters’ inability 
to accurately discern their surroundings—evident from the carrot/turnip and 
chameleonic boots examples—K.’s discernment repeatedly fails. For instance, in the 
Cathedral scene, K. initially admires a painting of a “tall knight in armor,” but upon a 
closer look, abruptly realizes it is actually a “conventional depiction of the entombment 
of Christ” (Kafka 207). Here, time moves both forward and backward, demonstrating the 
qualities of “morbid eccentricity” and “distortion” that dominate K.’s nightmare 
landscape, as well as the landscape of Ernst Ludwig Kirchner’s Potsdamer Platz (1914), 
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for instance—both of which Lukács would consider inherently modernist (Lukács 31, 
33).8  
 K.’s helplessness against a predetermined destiny, despite the illusion of agency, 
constitutes another dimension of absurdity in The Trial. For example, the painter Titorelli 
offers K. legal advice, presenting and explaining several ostensible acquittal options 
(Kafka 152). Yet actual acquittal never happens; apparent acquittal and protraction turn 
out to be life-consuming ways that delay final conviction but further entangle him in 
court formalities. Apparently, K. does not have a choice and his agony is lifelong. For K., 
the nonsensical legal “options” fly in the face of his rational expectations, which are 
similar to those that Ortega y Gasset outlines in The Revolt of the Masses, particularly 
the expectations of having a “horizon of possibilities” regarding how to live and the 
ability “to exercise [one’s] liberty, to decide what [one] is going to be in this world” 
(Ortega 47-48). Lukács summarizes how the “mood of total impotence, of paralysis in 
the face of the unintelligible power of circumstances, informs all [of Kafka’s] work” 
(Lukács 36).  
 Everything discussed thus far—absurdism, alienation, despair over the world’s 
irrationality, hopelessness—is traditionally associated with modernism. In spite of 
Kafka’s novel’s notable modernist tendencies and early twentieth-century publication 
date, Žižek posits that the theoretical structure of The Trial renders it a fundamentally 
postmodernist work. Agreeing with Žižek’s assertion that K.’s universe features fullness 
rather than absence, this thesis adds that in The Trial, the Real operates 
rhizomatically—the defining quality of a postmodernist work.  
 
8 See Appendix Figure 8. 
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 Foremost, The Trial does not feature the central lack evident in the works 
examined in the previous chapter. Whereas, for example, Waiting for Godot portrays a 
void of logic, K.’s world still operates according to some logic—it is just unfamiliar and 
opaque to K. The Parable of the Law is a notable example. When the prison chaplain 
walks through several (what he believes to be) sound interpretations of the parable, K. 
finds them each contradictory and absurd (Kafka 217-223). K. cannot follow the 
chaplain’s “logic” when arguing that the doorkeeper—whom K. believes is deceitful—is 
rather compassionate and the victim of deception himself, or that the statement “that he 
can’t grant him admittance now” necessarily implies that “this entrance was meant 
solely for [him]” (Kafka 219-220, 217). Meanwhile, the idea of a void of morality, as 
discussed in relation to The Sun Also Rises and Waiting for Godot, does not adequately 
fit The Trial either. Dismissing Lukács’s interpretation that emphasizes “the hidden, non-
existent God of Kafka’s world,” Žižek proposes that “the formula of the ‘absent God’ in 
Kafka does not work at all: for Kafka’s problem is, on the contrary, that in this universe 
God is too present, in the guise of various obscene, nauseous phenomena” (Lukács 44, 
Žižek 146). Modernist works revolve around a central emptiness; Žižek emphasizes that 
in The Trial, what would be the “empty place… is always already filled out by an inert, 
obscene, revolting presence” (Žižek 146).  
 In order for Žižek’s analysis to hold, The Trial’s oppressive bureaucratic legal 
structure, which is normally assumed to be part of the Symbolic order, needs to instead 
align with the Real. Given the boldness of this assertion, this section discusses the 
various ways in which the absurd legal system actually functions as the Real within this 
text before exploring how it is particularly a rhizomatic (and thus, postmodernist) Real. 
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Overall, the nonsensical legal mechanism in The Trial aligns with the Real through its 
incomprehensibility, obscenity, and inescapability. The rhizomatic legal structure 
demolishes and floods past any Real-Symbolic barrier that modernist works strive to 
uphold—thereby producing a Žižekian-Lacanian anxiety.  
 The court system accords with the Real through its utter incomprehensibility. K. 
notes the guard’s “incomprehensible” look during his initial arrest, as well as the 
sexton’s “incomprehensible” behavior during the penultimate scene at the Cathedral, 
demonstrating how, over the course of the text, clarification never occurs (Kafka 8, 208). 
Moreover, the Real of the law’s incomprehensibility often manifests as a type of 
inaccessibility, such as the “officially secret” legal documents that the lawyer prevents K. 
from accessing (Kafka 112-113). Incomprehensibility also manifests as linguistic 
obscurity: K. admits that he “scarcely kn[ows] what they [are] talking about,” fails to 
comprehend the Italian’s speech, and shamefully realizes that although others are 
“speaking to him… he [cannot] understand them; he hear[s] only the noise that filled 
everything” (Kafka 103, 202, 78).   
 The law’s obscenity further connects it to the Real. Sexual obscenity is directly 
tied to the law: K. opens law books with the minimal logical expectation of finding legal 
information, but instead the pages reveal “an indecent picture” of a couple “sitting naked 
on a divan” (Kafka 57). Sexual obscenity later explodes in the courtroom during K.’s trial 
in the form of a “public act of sexual intercourse” (Žižek 149). Kafka portrays women 
connected to the court as especially licentious. Leni, the lawyer’s caretaker and 
mistress, also seduces K. (Kafka 108). The young girls—“thirteen at most”—outside 
Titorelli’s atelier who “belong to the court” convey a strange blend of childishness and 
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developed sexuality by “painting [their] lips red,” and “lifting [their] little skirt[s], which 
[were] extremely short to begin with” (Kafka 141, 150, 143, 141).    
 Similar to Žižek’s reading of pornography in Looking Awry, The Trial’s legal 
system is obscene in the sense that it “goes too far” and insists on showing “the [Real] 
thing itself” against K.’s will (Žižek 110). When touring the court offices, K. weakly 
entreats, “‘Well, I’ve seen what things look like here, and I’m ready to leave.’ ‘You 
haven’t seen everything yet,’ said the court usher, completely without guile. ‘I don’t want 
to see everything… I want to leave, where’s the exit?’” (Kafka 71-72). Sickened by his 
exposure to the Real during his tour, he wants above all “to avoid... being led farther on, 
for the farther he went, the worse things would get”—a clear instance of being repelled 
by the Real, that at other times, fascinates him (Kafka 74). Another figure of the court 
acknowledges that they have been “telling [K.] all [their] intimate secrets, or more 
accurately, forcing them upon him, [when] he has no interest in knowing them,” 
illustrating how from K.’s perspective, too much has been shown (Kafka 76).  
 Since Žižek hypothesizes that the Real “simultaneously attracts and repels us,” 
locating the court as the Real makes sense of K.’s confusing oscillation between a 1) 
repulsion from the law, as discussed above, and 2) curiosity about the law (Žižek 133). 
Striving to learn more about the legal process, K. expresses his desire to investigate the 
“depository places,” which is where “an arrested man’s property is taken” (Kafka 50). It 
is important, however, to acknowledge that his desire to learn more about the intricacies 
of the law is not merely a fascination with the Real, but also likely to some degree for 
the purpose of ascertaining knowledge that is advantageous to overcome his situation. 
The flogging and Cathedral scenes more clearly expose his curiosity about the Real. 
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Upon hearing groans in the closet—perhaps expecting a covert sexual act—K. is 
“seized by such an uncontrollable curiosity that he practically [tears] the door open,” 
finding instead a flogger and two victims (Kafka 80-81). In the Cathedral, K. takes “rapid 
strides toward the pulpit—out of curiosity as well” (Kafka 212). Yet, reciprocally, K. 
frequently rushes to find the “exit,” disgusted, such as during the initial hearing (Kafka 
52). K.’s act of reaching over to “snatch the notebook from the magistrate’s hands and 
lift it to his fingertips by a single center page, as if he were repelled by it,” declaring that 
he could “barely stand to touch it with the tips of two fingers,” perfectly captures his 
desire to get closer to the Real of the law that also repulses him (Kafka 46).  
 Furthermore, taking the entire legal mechanism in The Trial as the Real helps 
elucidate the bizarre enjoyment K. derives from participating in the ludicrous court 
formalities: K. demonstrates a Žižekian “idiotic enjoyment” of the “heinous” and 
“disgusting” Real (Žižek 129). K. believes that “lawyers… all seem so disgusting and 
useless,” and that the guards’ faces are nauseating (Kafka 179, 227). Yet at the same 
time, he receives some level of enjoyment from interacting with them. The fact that he 
disapproves of “being treated with strange carelessness or indifference” implies his 
desire to receive more personal attention from them (Kafka 39). Additionally, K. explains 
that “the arrest itself makes [him] laugh,” and he even ends up joining in the booming 
laughter of the crowd that mocks him (Kafka 47, 44). Upon making time to focus on his 
trial amid his banking work, K. appears pleased, as he is “almost happy to be able to 
devote himself totally to his case for a while” (Kafka 139). The fact that K. even 
“mention[s] the trial to a few acquaintances with a certain inexplicable feeling of self-
satisfaction,” exposes a type of enjoyment from the nonsensical attention directed at 
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him (Kafka 125). In the final scene, K. willingly submits to the guards leading him to his 
death, admitting that “part of the pleasure he gave the men by doing so was transmitted 
back to him” (Kafka 227). Orson Welles’s film version of The Trial (1963) emphasizes 
the climax of K.’s sickly enjoyment: standing beside the dynamite block, seconds before 
his death, K. hysterically laughs—indicating his derailment to insanity—only cut off by 
his obliteration in the explosion (Welles 1:56:28). Evidently, K.’s universe features the 
law as a “heterogeneous, inconsistent, bricolage penetrated with enjoyment” (Žižek 
149).  
 Having substantiated the notion of the court’s alignment with the Real rather than 
the Symbolic register, it is now appropriate to shift to exploring how the Real of the Law 
is rhizomatic in structure. Rather than modernist angst of an impending doom, of 
delaying an evental collapse of the Real-Symbolic threshold, as seen in Sun Also Rises 
and Waiting for Godot, The Trial illustrates an acceleration toward and trespassing of 
the threshold. The Trial opens with an intrusion across the threshold of privacy: “There 
was an immediate knock at the door and a man he’d never seen before in these 
lodgings entered” (Kafka 3). Here, there is no indication that K. has given permission for 
the guards to come in. In another example, K. refers to the entrance of Titorelli’s atelier 
as a “threshold” (Kafka 142). Titorelli’s frustrating struggle to guard his atelier against 
the young girls who “tr[y] to push their way in… against his will” and entropically “mak[e] 
a mess in every corner of the room” signifies a failure to prevent the Real from 
pervading and ravaging everyday reality (Kafka 142-143). The fact that the girls—whose 
obscenity ties them to the Real of the law—poke through the “cracks between the 
boards” illustrates how the rhizome “grows between,” filling out the cracks in the 
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Symbolic order (Kafka 144, Deleuze & Guattari 19). In the flogging scene, K. similarly 
describes the office closet’s door as a “threshold,” and, in a characteristically 
postmodernist way, gravitates toward it, “practically [tearing] the door open” (Kafka 80-
81). Given the graphic description of how the victim “claw[s] convulsively about his 
hands… the rod f[inds] him on the floor as well, as he writhe[s] beneath it, its tip 
sw[ings] up and down steadily,” this punishment’s brutality clearly exemplifies a 
Badiouian “absolute violence of the Real” that is exposed by trespassing the threshold 
(Kafka 84, Badiou 52). In contrast to the modernist “contempt for everything that 
represents an installation,” at the end of The Trial, K. voluntarily accelerates toward the 
installation of his murder (Badiou 24). When the guards physically restraining him pause 
on their journey, K. asserts, “I didn’t really want to stop” (Kafka 228). He even “pull[s] 
the men forward forcibly…. K. start[s] to run and the men ha[ve] to run with him, 
although they were gasping for breath,” proving his initiative in crossing the threshold of 
his own death (Kafka 229). Welles’s film version of The Trial supports this interpretation 
as well, as K. visibly leads the pack and yanks the guards on either side of him farther 
along (Welles 1:52:07-1:53:20). The Trial repeatedly demonstrates “the trespassing of 
the frontier that separates the vital domain from the judicial domain,” such as during the 
act of sexual intercourse in the courthouse (Žižek 147).9  
 Piet Mondrian’s painting Composition (1921) verges on postmodernism, 
illustrating a similar disrespect for the barrier: the stark red square in the upper right 
trespasses the black line threshold, almost flowing off the edge of the canvas.10 The 
blood red color appropriately conveys the concomitant anxiety at this moment of 
 
9 An idea that Žižek attributes to Reiner Stach. 
10 See Appendix Figure 9.  
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flooding the threshold. As some of the black lines do not fully extend to the canvas 
perimeter, Composition highlights the inefficacy of the barrier, which postmodernist 
works ultimately dissolve.   
 In Kafka’s novel, the pervasive haze functions to further undermine any 
distinction between inside and outside, instead blending these two, such that everything 
is milieu, “intermezzo” (Deleuze & Guattari 25). As such, the haze’s function is crucially 
different from that of the amorphous blob substance in The Unpleasant Profession of 
Jonathan Hoag that Žižek analyzes as a modernist Real (Žižek 14). While the couple in 
Heinlein’s story can roll up their window and keep driving, K.’s efforts are not nearly as 
successful. Although Kafka initially associates haze with the “inside” of legal spaces, as 
K. notes that the “foglike haze in the [court]room was extremely annoying,” Kafka later 
attributes this same “semidarkness, haze, and dust” to the outside (Kafka 49, 43). For 
instance, K.’s efforts to seek solace by windows and doorways fail as “fog mingled with 
smoke [blows] in through the window from top to bottom and fill[s] the room,” and the 
dusty air from the atelier makes K. willing to “inhale even the [outside] fog with an open 
mouth” (Kafka 133, 155). The haze is everywhere; it thereby blurs and destroys the 
possibility of the traditional inside/outside binarism.11  
 K.’s attempts to escape or “get outside” of his trial—which constitutes an 
interesting inversion from modernist works, where characters often at least strive to 
keep the Real outside the comforts of their Symbolic—are futile. In postmodernist 
works, the inside/outside distinction does not exist. K.’s repeated declaration that he is 
 
11 Interestingly, Kafka’s haze functions similarly to the dog in Andrei Tarkovsky’s film Stalker (1979). 
By meandering through both the Zone and everyday reality, the dog blurs the distinction between the 
two realms, suggesting: everywhere is the Zone.   
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“completely detached from this whole affair” is in vain as he cannot separate his 
Symbolic-order daily life from the Real of the law; they interweave and operate on the 
same plane (Kafka 49). The inability to exit climaxes at the Cathedral as K. debates 
walking out the doors but decides to turn around, recognizing the futility of trying to run 
away: “there was no escaping it” (Kafka 211). Clearly, K.’s overarching project of 
learning how to “break out of it… how to live outside the trial,” is impossible in a 
postmodernist universe (Kafka 214).   
 Žižek explains how the annihilation of the barrier and flooding of the Real 
throughout reality—characteristic of postmodernist works—produces anxiety, which K. 
clearly demonstrates. In Looking Awry, Žižek explains how postmodernist works destroy 
“the barrier separating the [R]eal from reality,” which is “the very condition of a minimum 
of ‘normalcy’: ‘madness’ (psychosis) sets in when this barrier is torn down, when the 
[R]eal overflows the reality” (Žižek 20). Consequently, “what provokes anxiety is… [the] 
proximity” of the horrific Real (Žižek 146). Žižek’s argument that “the danger of… getting 
too close to the object” in effect “gives rise to anxiety,” is a clear extension of Lacanian 
thought: Lacan proposes that “anxiety then is the signal of the [R]eal” (Žižek 8, Lacan 
Seminar XIII 4). Accordingly, since the “various obscene, nauseous phenomena” 
associated with the Real of the Law have “gotten too close to” K., his universe is 
therefore a “universe of anxiety” (Žižek 146).  
 K. demonstrates several physical ramifications (such as his “seasickness”) of his 
proximity to the Real of the law that indicate his experience of intense anxiety (Kafka 
78). For instance, K.’s dizziness correlates to the proximity of an unnamed legal figure; 
he becomes dizzy as “her face… [draws] quite near” (Kafka 73). Upon touring the court 
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offices, he proclaims: “I’m dizzy, and I feel sick when I stand on my own,” but that once 
he is “led… out of the law offices”—distancing himself from the Real—he will 
consequently “feel better” (Kafka 75). Kafka cites a lawyer’s hampering “illness” from 
working so closely with the law (Kafka 102). K.’s constant anxiety results in extreme 
fatigue, as he proceeds through life “tired from what he had already gone through, and 
tiredly awaiting what was yet to come” (Kafka 128). Although the hazy air often 
functions as an easy scapegoat for his sickness, K.’s anxiety clearly arises from the 
proximity and ubiquity of the rhizomatic legal machine overtaking his universe.   
 
White Noise 
Don DeLillo, 1985 
 White Noise depicts mass consumerism and relentless mortal dread in 1980s 
American suburbia. Protagonist Professor Jack Gladney, the inventor of Hitler studies, 
and his fourth wife Babette, a posture instructor for the elderly, navigate a society of 
surface, immediacy, and materialist gratification; they are visibly debilitated by the 
threatening Real of death that fills out the cracks of their splintered Symbolic order. 
Characters Babette and Jack demonstrate some stereotypically modernist tendencies—
such as striving to fill absence by searching for meaning or morality, trying to distract 
from the Real and keep it at a distance—yet the text as a whole insists on presence 
(rather than absence) and a rhizomatic Real that is impossible to barricade against, 
making White Noise lean postmodernist overall. Concisely, Jack and Babette are 
“modernist[s] displaced in a postmodern world” (Wilcox 348).  
 Jack admits that “Watching children sleep makes [him] feel devout, part of a 
spiritual system. It is the closest [he] can come to God” (DeLillo 147). His strategy of 
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watching children sleep implies his otherwise lack of a spiritual system, in the same way 
that Brett’s statement does in The Sun Also Rises: “deciding not to be a bitch” is “sort of 
what we have instead of God” (Hemingway 220-221). Perceiving the labyrinthine 
simulacra of his society as devoid of authentic meaning, Jack also acknowledges that 
he is “ready to search anywhere for signs and hints, intimations of odd comfort” (DeLillo 
154). Although Jack tries to plug the ethical lack that he registers, DeLillo’s text 
persistently propagates a new universal value system, one that champions materialistic 
abundance and dependence on technology. 
 Babette and Jack incessantly worry about their ultimate fate of being swallowed 
by the Real; they develop strategies in efforts to control the Real, just as characters do 
in The Sun Also Rises and Waiting for Godot. By professing about Hitler and the “horror 
of the [R]eal” that “fascinated the militants of the twentieth century” and perversely 
motivated genocide, Jack attempts to gain control over the Real of death: “Death was 
strictly a professional matter here. [He] was comfortable with it, [he] was on top of it” 
(Badiou 19, DeLillo 74). Babette’s job, too, tries to assert dominance over the eventual 
decay and deformation of the body, as people “seem to believe it is possible to ward off 
death by following rules of good grooming”—grooming in this example specifically refers 
to posture (DeLillo 27). Meanwhile, Jack’s friend Murray believes the taking others’ lives 
is a way of asserting control over mortality, proposing that “the killer… attempts to 
defeat his own death by killing others”—a strategy that resembles matador Romero’s 
evasion of decimation by the bull, instead killing it himself in The Sun Also Rises 
(DeLillo 291, Hemingway 153-154). Another similar chord between these two texts is 
the characters’ substance abuse as a strategy to forget the inevitable Real. In 
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Hemingway’s text, protagonist Jake drinks to shake off the “feeling of things coming that 
you could not prevent happening. Under the wine [he] lost the disgusted feeling and 
was happy”; Babette turns to a drug that, much more frankly, “interacts with 
neurotransmitters that are related to the fear of death” (Hemingway 135, DeLillo 200).  
 While DeLillo’s characters try to distance themselves from the repulsive Real, 
they also gravitate toward it; such oscillatory behavior is in accordance with Žižek’s idea 
that the Real “simultaneously attracts and repels” (Žižek 133). In particular, scenes of 
violent destruction on television fascinate the characters. They attentively watch 
“houses slide into the ocean, whole villages crackle and ignite in a mass of advancing 
lava. Every disaster [makes them] wish for more, for something bigger, grander, more 
sweeping,” alluding to the unsignifiable Real (DeLillo 64). Jack’s friend coins the 
terminology “brain fade” as the reason for people’s inclination to rubberneck, in a sense; 
in a Debordian society of the spectacle or Baudrillardian hyperreality, the characters 
cling to a Real “occasional catastrophe to break up the incessant bombardment of 
information…. Only a catastrophe gets [their] attention. [They] want them, [they] need 
them, [they] depend on them” (DeLillo 66).12 Then, during the penultimate scene at the 
motel where Jack nearly murders Mink, the scientist behind the drug Babette takes to 
forget, Jack advances toward the Real of death, mesmerized by the grotesqueness of 
Mink’s bleeding body, peering closer to become “nearer to death, nearer to second 
sight…. [He] advanced two steps” (DeLillo 309). While characters take Mink’s pills to 
distract from death, in this scene the pills ironically function to propel Mink closer toward 
his fate of irreversible annihilation: Mink desperately “ingest[s] more pills, throwing them 
 
12 These concepts are discussed in Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle (1967) and Jean 
Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation (1981). 
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in his face, sucking them like sweets” and “grab[s] more tablets from his pocket, 
hurl[ing] them toward his open mouth,” in an acceleration toward the Real of death that 
verges on suicide (DeLillo 308, 312).  
 Although modernists Jack and Babette register death negatively as lack, 
discussing how the event punctures “a hole in space and time” and creates “a great 
yawning gulf,” White Noise as a whole undermines this idea, instead registering death 
as a proximate, inescapable presence (DeLillo 101). In Looking Awry, Žižek explains 
how postmodernist works show “the Thing itself as the incarnated, materialized 
emptiness”; presence necessarily fills out emptiness (Žižek 145). To understand this 
concept of the presence of emptiness, so to speak, it is helpful to explore an early 
textual example:  the most photographed barn in America (DeLillo 12). 
Counterintuitively, “no one sees the barn”—it is effectively an empty lot (DeLillo 12). The 
main activity of this tourist attraction, rather than taking pictures of the barn, becomes: 
“taking pictures of taking pictures” (DeLillo 13). There is a transposition between the 
audience regarding the lack of the event and the audience becoming the presence of 
the event. Beyond White Noise, in the musical domain, John Cage’s experimental piano 
composition 4:33 (1952) serves as another example of presence occupying the place of 
ostensible lack. Outwardly a complete lack of performance, a three-movement 
performance of silence, in which the pianist sits without touching the keys, the 
composition actually depends on (and redirects focus toward) the unintentional 
spontaneity and background noises of a present audience. The audience collectively 
adopts the role of musician.   
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 The above examples help to grapple with how White Noise insists on death as a 
haunting presence, in opposition to the characters’ understanding that death leaves 
“holes, abysses and gaps” (DeLillo 101). In a bizarre nighttime encounter, Jake believes 
he sees death incarnate, in the form of “a white-haired man sitting erect in the old 
wicker chair,” and ponders, “was the white hair purely emblematic, part of his allegorical 
force?... He would be Death” (DeLillo 242-243). Although the unexpected visitor 
humorously turns out to be his father-in-law, this scene clearly illustrates Žižek’s idea of 
“incarnated, materialized emptiness,” and parallels his postmodernist reading of Waiting 
for Godot, which he theorizes would incorporate “Godot himself on stage… by chance 
at the place of the Thing; he would be the incarnation of the Thing whose arrival was 
awaited” (Žižek 145). Broadly, throughout White Noise, the “dead have a presence” 
(DeLillo 98). 
 The presence of the Real of death here is distinctly rhizomatic in structure; the 
planar imbrication of Real and Symbolic forces in White Noise ultimately renders it 
postmodernist. The Real repeatedly cracks into characters’ thoughts and conversations: 
DeLillo often evenly incorporates death and superficial Symbolic details in the same 
sentence. For instance, Jack’s friend imagines how a man “dies suddenly, after a short 
illness, in his own bed, with a comforter and matching pillows, on a rainy Wednesday 
afternoon, feverish, a little congested in the sinuses and chest, thinking about his dry 
cleaning” (DeLillo 39). Here, there is a strikingly equivalent emphasis on the man’s 
death and his linens—down to the trivial, irrelevant details of how they comprise a 
matching bedding set or are in the wash. In another example, Jack imagines a woman 
“in a soup commercial taking off her oilskin hat as she entered the cheerful kitchen 
 44 
where her husband stood over a pot of smoky lobster bisque, a smallish man with six 
weeks to live” (DeLillo 22). By slipping mortality into the end of this sentence, DeLillo 
shows how the Real cracks into even the cozy, cherished, and “safe” domestic space. 
Additionally, Jack’s description of his Advanced Nazism course—“parades, rallies and 
uniforms, three credits, written reports”—jumbles the secondary education system’s 
Symbolic formalities (i.e., credits, reports) with manifestations of an abhorrent Real 
(parades, rallies, uniforms) (DeLillo 25). The fact that Jack teaches Hitler studies, 
largely centering on themes of death and Badiouian violence, demonstrates a persistent 
Real-Symbolic imbrication in his daily life. Later, Babette listens to Jack’s friend Murray 
rant about Tibetan death rituals as she grocery shops (DeLillo 37-38). As they roam the 
supermarket aisles, tossing some yogurt into their cart, Murray discusses how “Tibetans 
try to see death for what it is…. Dying is an art in Tibet,” a scene that clearly exemplifies 
the planar imbrication of the gravity of the Real and triviality of the Symbolic (DeLillo 
38).  
 Moreover, the “airborne toxic event”—whose lethality ties it to death—reiterates 
the rhizomatic nature of the Real in this text (DeLillo 117). In this chapter, a chemical 
spillage produces “a heavy black mass hanging in the air beyond the river, more or less 
shapeless” (DeLillo 110). Characteristically postmodernist, the Real oozes past its 
designated threshold—in cannot be contained. Jack describes how this confrontation 
with the noxious “enormous dark mass… was a terrible thing to see, so close, so low”; 
he recognizes “the thing that threatens [his] life… see[ing] it as a cosmic force, so much 
larger than [him]self, more powerful” (DeLillo 127). This amorphous “dark black 
breathing thing” mirrors the vast “grey and formless mist, pulsing slowly as if with 
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inchoate life” that Žižek analyzes from The Unpleasant Profession of Jonathan Hoag, 
yet they remain fundamentally different in certain respects (DeLillo 111, Žižek 14). 
Namely, the couple in Heinlein’s novella can successfully keep out the mist by rolling up 
their car window; Jack and Babette, however, cannot do the same in the context of the 
postmodernist Real’s ubiquitous network. Death in White Noise “continues to grow, 
acquire breadth and scope, new outlets, new passages… the dead are closer to [them] 
than ever” (DeLillo 150). Jack emphasizes the cloud of death’s inescapability: it is “so 
close to [him], so surely upon [him]” (DeLillo 118). Rather than being blocked by a 
window pane, the chemical cloud becomes infinitely proximate to the characters as the 
miniscule particles lodge inside their lungs, connecting victims rhizomatically. Jack 
notes how the “little breath of Nyodene has planted a death in [his] body”; it grows within 
his body to form “a nebulous mass” that “has no definite shape, form or limits” in a 
typically Deleuzian way (DeLillo 280, 150). Heinlein’s modernist depiction of the cloud 
as a void, which characters can shut out, fundamentally differs from DeLillo’s 
postmodernist portrayal of the cloud as a lethal presence that is already inside the 
characters’ bodies (Žižek 14).  
 
Caché [Hidden] 
Michael Haneke, 2005 
 The sudden onset of a series of unsolicited VHS cassette recordings and graphic 
drawings from an anonymous stalker destabilizes the otherwise superficial operations of 
the upper-middle class Laurent family. Georges Laurent believes the unnerving 
deliveries are a form of revenge by Majid—an orphan whom Georges’s parents take in 
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until Georges construes lies to convince them to put him up for adoption. Majid’s 
parents likely died in the October 17, 1961 massacre, along with over two hundred other 
innocent French-Algerians drowned in the Seine that day. While Haneke’s psychological 
thriller explores this haunting historical event, this project does not analyze the work 
primarily in relation to postcolonial theory, but focuses on its postmodernist theoretical 
structure, specifically dissecting how the Real functions within the work.  
 Whereas in The Trial, the bureaucratic legal system functions as the Real—
evident from its incomprehensibility, obscenity, ubiquity, unparalleled ability to provoke 
debilitating anxiety, etc.—in Caché, the unsolicited videos and drawings serve as 
disturbing intrusions of the Real into la vie quotidienne. In Žižek’s Dialectics, Critique of 
Ideology and Emancipatory Politics in Michael Haneke’s film Caché (2016), Murdoch 
Jennings reads the “smooth-functioning domesticity and social edifice” of the Laurent’s 
family’s “bourgeois space [as] homologous” to Žižek’s big Other, which makes sense as 
the home is the locus of family rituals and the classic faux comforts of the Symbolic 
(Jennings 4). Visually, the domestic and work spheres for both Georges and his wife 
Anne brim with an excess of stacked books, marking these spaces as grounded in the 
Symbolic, just as language is; the content of the bombarding deliveries of the Real, 
then, are appropriately devoid of language.13 The repeated “intrusion signals that 
something foreign has suddenly entered this self-enclosed space,” causing not only 
“inconsistency and confusion,” but profound Žižekian-Lacanian anxiety (Jennings 4). 
The couple’s anxiety is obvious, such as when Georges wakes up from his nightmare 
about Majid, panting, drenched in sweat (Haneke 0:38:54).  
 
13 Save trivialities such as the postcards’ written addresses.  
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 Additionally, Haneke’s film depicts both Žižekian obscenity and Badiouian “horror 
of the [R]eal” (Badiou 19). In “Figures of Disgust,” Christa Blümlinger analyzes “the 
slaughter of a rooster as an enigmatic pulsing blot, as something too close and 
disgusting, [which] prefigures the later suicide” of Majid, clearly drawing on Žižekian 
language about the “pulsing of the pre[S]ymbolic substance,” the “nonsensical ‘blot,’” 
and being “too close to das Ding” (Blümlinger 155, Žižek 15, 95, 146). In contrast to 
Waiting for Godot’s frustrating lack of an event, Caché bluntly shows the event of Majid 
slicing his throat, which also slices through the film in an explosion of Badiouian 
“absolute violence of the [R]eal” (Badiou 52). Not only is too much shown to Georges in 
this moment, similar to when the court usher introduces K. to the prisoners and 
continues the tour against his will; too much is shown to the viewer, who is often 
uncomfortably situated at the point of voyeur (Kafka 71-73).  
 Importantly, the Real rhizomatically fills out the cracks of the superficial Symbolic 
order in Caché, thereby rendering the work postmodernist. As the rhizome extends 
infinitely such that everywhere becomes milieu, there is no true distinction between 
inside and outside—mandating its inescapable, anxiety-inducing proximate status. 
Mirroring The Trial’s God who is “too present, in the guise of various obscene, 
nauseous phenomena” associated with the law, Caché’s “ubiquitous, omniscient, 
omnipresent God of the tapes” is “at once remote and ‘outside,’ yet totally ‘inside’ as 
well” (Žižek 146, Elsaesser 67). Although the tapes are left outside the house, they 
always make their way inside, also invading Pierrot’s school (Haneke 0:19:55) and 
Georges’s office (01:05:25). Via the news channel, the Real repeatedly cracks into their 
cherished domestic space, first showing a hospitalization scene (0:14:55) and then 
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anarchic Middle-Eastern conflict (1:12:10). The Real’s simultaneous inside and outside 
status—like Kafka’s haze—once again destroys the possibility of a barrier. In this way, 
the hallway’s set of three doors separating the outside from the domestic sphere is 
ironically ineffective, representing the faux barrier between Real and Symbolic orders. 
The “Kafka[esque] architecture” of the Laurent’s house, specifically the ostensible non-
correlation between the spacious, labyrinthine interior and modest exterior, in which 
there is “more of it ‘inside’ than appears possible to the outside view,” further supports 
this idea of an ever-present milieu: Žižek suggests that such a “disproportion can be 
abolished only by demolishing the barrier, by letting the outside swallow the inside” 
(Žižek 15-16). The “exterior” Real rhizomatically permeates the inside space and the 
entire Symbolic order. Thus, Georges statement, “I’m going to leave now,” parallels K.’s: 
“I’m ready to leave” (Haneke 0:53:16, Kafka 71). Both expressions are futile as it is 













 Since “all culture is ultimately nothing but a compromise formation, a reaction to 
some terrifying, radically inhuman dimension proper to the human condition itself,” as 
Žižek writes, the fundamental difference between modernist and postmodernist thought 
boils down to the way that the Real emerges in their universe—which is the origin of the 
work’s derivative formal and thematic characteristics (Žižek 37). This project has 
endeavored not to delineate a rigid, inflexible classification system, but rather to 
propose and substantiate a theory-based approach to grapple with the ideas of 
modernism and postmodernism. Overall, I hope to have shown that the paradigms of 
the extimate modernist torus and ubiquitous, proximate postmodernist rhizome take us 
far in illuminating the distinction between the form of the Real-Symbolic relation as it 
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